Perceived distributive justice and Leader-Member Exchange: an exploration among Dutch and Polish (agency) workers by Torka, Nicole & Goedegebure, Ivy
www.ssoar.info
Perceived distributive justice and Leader-Member
Exchange: an exploration among Dutch and Polish
(agency) workers
Torka, Nicole; Goedegebure, Ivy
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Verlag Barbara Budrich
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Torka, N., & Goedegebure, I. (2017). Perceived distributive justice and Leader-Member Exchange: an exploration
among Dutch and Polish (agency) workers. Industrielle Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und
Management, 24(1), 100-123. https://doi.org/10.3224/indbez.v24i1.06
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-SA Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-SA Licence
(Attribution-ShareAlike). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63495-5
Industrielle Beziehungen 1/2017, S. 100-123 https://doi.org/10.3224/indbez.v24i1.06 
Nicole Torka, Ivy Goedegebure* 
Perceived distributive justice and Leader-Member 
Exchange: An exploration among Dutch and Polish 
(agency) workers** 
 
 
 
Abstract  
We compare the distributive justice perceptions of agency workers and permanent staff concerning 
different aspects of HRM. Moreover, we investigate if the supervisor-subordinate relationship quality 
(Leader-Member Exchange, LMX) influences the relationship between the contract status and distrib-
utive justice perceptions. We conducted semi-structured interviews in three Dutch logistics companies 
and distributed questionnaires among workers performing low-skilled jobs. Results show that a direct 
relationship between contract status and distributive justice perceptions remains when testing the me-
diator effect of LMX. Contract status seems partly to determine perceived LMX and, consequently, 
perceived distributive justice. However, the differences in perceived justice concerning voice, partici-
pation and pay between the worker groups change when individual workers perceive high-quality 
LMX. Thus, not only between group differences might be relevant, but also within group differences. 
Wahrgenommene Verteilungsgerechtigkeit und Leader-Member 
Exchange: Eine Exploration unter niederländischen und 
polnischen (Leih)Arbeitern  
Zusammenfassung  
Wir vergleichen die wahrgenommene Verteilungsgerechtigkeit bei Festangestellten und Leiharbeit-
nehmern hinsichtlich verschiedener Aspekte des HRM. Es wird untersucht, ob die Qualität der Vorge-
setzten-Mitarbeiter-Beziehung (Leader-Member Exchange, LMX) die Beziehung zwischen Vertrags-
status und wahrgenommener Verteilungsgerechtigkeit wie vermutet beeinflusst. Wir haben teilstruk-
turierte Interviews in drei niederländischen Logistikunternehmen erhoben und Arbeitskräfte in gering 
qualifizierter Beschäftigung mit einem Fragebogen befragt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Bezie-
hung zwischen Vertragsstatus und wahrgenommener Verteilungsgerechtigkeit beim Test des Media-
tor-Effekts von LMX bestehen bleibt. Der Vertragsstatus scheint die Wahrnehmung des LMX und 
                                                                          
* Dr. Nicole Torka (corresponding author), Twente School of Management (TSM), Enschede/The Netherlands. 
E-mail: nicoletorka@gmail.com. 
 Drs. Ivy Goedegebure, Saxion University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands. 
 
** The authors would like to thank mr. drs. Suzanne Hidajat – Engelsman and the reviewers for their contribu-
tions for making this article possible. 
 Artikel eingegangen: 21.1.2013  
revidierte Fassung akzeptiert nach doppelt-blindem Begutachtungsverfahren: 26.9.2016. 
Perceived distributive justice and Leader-Member Exchange 101 
folglich das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden (teilweise) zu determinieren. Es ändern sich die Unterschiede 
im Gerechtigkeitsgefühl hinsichtlich der Mitsprache, der Mitbestimmung und des Gehalts zwischen 
den Gruppen, wenn individuelle Arbeitskräfte eine hohe LMX Qualität wahrnehmen. D.h. es sind Un-
terschiede zwischen Gruppen und auch innerhalb von Gruppen zu beachten.  
  
Key words: (Polish) temp agency workers, perceived distributive justice, LMX, voice, participa-
tion (JEL: L2, M5, Y8) 
Introduction 
Many studies show that, compared to permanent staff, agency workers perceive and receive 
unequal treatment (e.g. Brinkmann & Nachtwey, 2014; Helfen et al., 2015; Nienhüser & 
Matiaske, 2006) as well as experience other occupational disadvantages (e.g., risk of losing 
skills; see, for example, Dütsch & Struck, 2014). Policy makers and scholars have recog-
nised this inequality issue seems to differ across European countries and pointed to inequal-
ities in legislation as one of the main causes. Consequently, the European Union has sought 
to harmonise the law across European Union member states, enacting the Agency Work Di-
rective (2008/104/EC). The aim of this legislation is to guarantee agency workers equal 
rights, compared to permanent staff in the same business who do the same job, on basic 
working and employment conditions (e.g., pay, working time, holidays, pregnancy leave). 
However, the Directive only concerns basic conditions and excludes many other areas of 
Human Resource Management (HRM) such as the job content, voice and development op-
portunities. Thus, even after implementing the Directive, opportunities for agencies and us-
er firms remain for treating agency workers unequally.  
Research within organisations about agency workers justice perceptions is still in de-
mand (e.g. Connelly & Gallagher, 2004; Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2006; Holm et al., 2016; 
Giunchi et al., 2015; Giunchi et al., 2016). This article contributes to filling this knowledge 
gap by comparing the distributive justice perceptions of agency workers and permanent 
staff concerning different aspects of HRM (i.e., pay, physical working conditions, job con-
tent, information, voice, direct participation, development opportunities) in three user firms 
from the Dutch logistics industry. 
Moreover, we investigate if the supervisor-subordinate relationship quality (Leader-
Member Exchange [LMX], e.g. Graen et al., 1982a, 1982b; Graen & Schiemann, 1978) in-
fluences the supposed relationship between the contract status (i.e., agency vs. permanent 
workers) and distributive justice perceptions. To date, LMX has still been largely neglected 
as an experience that might play a role in this relationship and in agency work research in 
general (for an exception see Flickinger et al., 2016). This is surprising since research 
shows that top management delegates operational HRM to direct supervisors (e.g. Perry & 
Kulik, 2008; Purcell & Hutchinson, 2007) and LMX strongly determines HRM quality and 
justice as perceived by workers (e.g. Andrews & Kacmar, 2001; Graen & Cashman, 1975; 
Lee, 2001; Scandura, 1999; Yukl & Fu, 1999). Moreover, the social exchange between the 
individual and his or her supervisor refers to interactional justice (e.g. Cropanzano et al., 
2002) and interactional justice has a strong positive influence on distributive justice percep-
tions (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001). 
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This paper adds even more to previous studies since our data set contains information 
on Dutch and Polish agency workers. Therefore, it is possible to report on distributive jus-
tice perceptions related to agency workers origin. Moreover, we can investigate if LMX in-
terferes in this relationship. In the Netherlands, people with a Polish nationality are by far 
the largest group among the so-called ‘flexmigrants’: agency workers who have been re-
cruited outside the Netherlands. 87.4 percent of all flexmigrants are of Polish origin (van 
Baars, 2014). According to the ABU (2016), the largest Dutch agency work employer asso-
ciation, flexmigrants are vital for the Dutch economy and especially for industries with do-
mestic labour shortages such as food, horticulture and logistics. Despite this economic im-
portance, work migrants and in particular those from Central Europe frequently seem to 
face discrimination in the Netherlands (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2015).  
To gain insight into HRM offered to the workers and test our hypotheses we conducted 
12 semi-structured interviews in three logistics companies and distributed questionnaires 
among workers performing low-skilled jobs. 241 respondents participated in the survey: 
109 Dutch permanent employees, 65 Dutch agency workers, and 67 Polish agency workers.  
This article is structured as follows. First, we present our theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses. After a discussion of the methodology deployed, we present the research find-
ings. Finally, we discuss the results and limitations as well as sketch implications for re-
search and practice. 
A theoretical endeavour 
Empirical studies show that if workers experience justice from their work organisation their 
attitudes improve (e.g., satisfaction, commitment) and, consequently, their performance 
(e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001; Cohen-Carash & Spector, 2001; Daileyl & Kirk, 1992; Meyer et 
al., 2002). Based on the work of authors such as Adams (1963, 1965), Cropanzano and Fol-
ger (1991), Greenberg (1990), and Thibaut and Walker (1974), Colquitt (2001) presented a 
four-component model of organisational justice, distinguishing between distributive, proce-
dural, interpersonal, and informational justice. For reasons presented below, we decided to 
focus on distributive justice as dependent variable, but, as we showed in the introduction, 
interactional justice (i.e., interpersonal and informational justice) plays also an important 
role since we take LMX into account (see explanation for hypotheses 3 and 4). 
Distributive justice generally refers to the individual’s perception of fair outcomes 
(Adams, 1963, 1965; Greenberg, 1990) such as pay and career decisions. People compare 
their rewards, costs and investments with those of comparable others. They psychologically 
evaluate everything of personal value in relation to their inputs (e.g. education, tenure and 
performance) and compare this relation of input and output to those of other people. Thus, 
agency workers will normally perceive distributive injustice if they believe comparable 
others ‒ permanent employees and/or agency workers in the same business who do the 
same job ‒ receive better HRM outcomes for an equal or lesser input, or equal HRM out-
comes for less or more input.  
We focus on distributive justice because the EU Agency Work Directive aims to abol-
ish the discrimination of agency workers concerning outcomes. Also, current Dutch regula-
tions (i.e., labour law and collective agreements between agency associations and unions) 
aim to reduce outcome inequality concerning basic working and employment conditions be-
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tween agency workers and permanent staff. However, distributive justice concerns more 
than basic conditions, and this means agencies and user companies can still treat agency 
workers differently from permanent employees concerning other aspects of HRM such as 
the job content and training opportunities. Given these facts and the mentioned results of 
empirical studies that show agency workers perceive less fair treatment than permanent 
staff (e.g. Brinkmann & Nachtwey, 2014; Helfen et al., 2015; Nienhüser & Matiaske, 
2006), we can formulate our first general hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  Agency workers perceive less distributive justice concerning different aspects of 
HRM than permanent employees. 
Research shows that the length of stay or ‘tenure’ with the agency and the user firm has a 
positive influence on the HRM quality as perceived by agency workers’ (e.g. Torka, 2003; 
Garcia-Serrano, 2004). Moreover, tenure plays an important role in Dutch regulations on 
temp agency work. Dutch regulations make a difference between phase A, B and C temp 
agency contracts. While in phase C agency workers have a permanent contract with the 
temp agency, the rights of agency workers in phase A (an agency tenure of less than 78 
weeks) and B are limited. For example, in phase A, when the worker is sick or the customer 
ceases the assignment the contract ends. Therefore, it is important to control for tenure 
when investigating possible differences between agency workers and permanent staff.  
The tenure issue shows that agency workers – like permanent staff – cannot be per-
ceived as a homogenous group and this is also true for other differences: They differ con-
cerning their preferences, individual characteristics, skills and so on (e.g. De Cuyper et al., 
2008; Guest, 2004). Thus, agency workers’ origin or, more precisely, their differential 
treatment because of their origin, might also explain differences in justice perceptions 
among agency workers and between agency workers and permanent staff. Concerning one 
issue flexmigrants seem not to receive different treatment than local agency workers in the 
Netherlands: The aforementioned phase of the temp agency contracts. 70.8 percent of the 
flexmigrants are subject to a phase A contract (phase B = 23.8%; phase C = 5.4%) (van 
Baars, 2014) compared to 85.7 percent of all agency workers (phase B = 11.7%; phase C = 
2.6%) (Vermeulen et al., 2014). Thus, the majority of agency workers - and independent of 
origin – fall into the ‘unprivileged’ short-term category. Compared to all agency workers, it 
is unclear why relatively fewer flexmigrants (mean difference is about 15%) fall into this 
category.  
However, further evidence shows that the position of work migrants and especially 
those from Central Europe might is more vulnerable than those of local agency workers. 
Work migrants who work for a temp agency might have to bear a double burden: compared 
to permanent staff, but alike local agency workers, they might perceive unequal treatment 
because of their contract status but, in contrast to local agency workers, additionally also 
because of their origin. After all, (flex)migrants frequently seem to face discrimination in 
the Netherlands. Recent research shows that in the Netherlands Polish people perceive an 
increase in group discrimination: While in 2010/2011 39 percent perceived discrimination 
of their origin group (i.e., group discrimination) ‘very frequently’, in 2012/2013 49 percent 
did so. Altogether, in the Netherlands 84 percent of the Polish people perceive discrimina-
tion of their origin group ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ including labour market discrim-
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ination (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2015). Moreover, a very recent study shows that compared to 
Germany, Ireland and the UK, Polish migrants perceive the most group discrimination in 
the Netherlands (McGinnity & Gijsberts, 2016). 
In the Netherlands, as well as in many other countries, discrimination among agency 
workers is officially prohibited. Thus, it is not allowed to offer equal agency workers une-
qual conditions because of, for example, differences in gender, race, age, and nationality. 
However, as mentioned before, current and future regulations preserve space for agencies 
and user firms to treat agency workers differently than permanent employees and among 
each other on issues beyond the basic conditions. Therefore, organisations still have ‘legal 
space’ to discriminate against migrant workers. As the above-mentioned studies show 
Polish people perceive increasing group discrimination in the Netherlands. Thus, it appears 
there is no warrant for assuming that Polish agency workers perceive treatment equal to 
those of Dutch agency workers. Moreover, it can be argued that work migrants might have 
relatively higher expectations concerning monetary rewards than local agency workers: Af-
ter all, they might make higher sacrifices (for example, leaving their home country and 
family [temporarily]) and have higher living costs (for example, housing in the Netherlands 
and abroad) than their local agency workers. Therefore, we formulate hypothesis 2 as fol-
lows:  
H2:  Polish agency workers perceive less distributive justice concerning different as-
pects of HRM than Dutch agency workers. 
Although hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on evidence, for two reasons it is too simplistic to as-
sume a direct relationship between contract status (here, agency vs. permanent workers) as 
well as agency workers origin (here, Dutch vs. Polish origin) and perceived organisational 
justice: (1) Some user firms seem to treat agency workers as their ‘own’ permanent staff and, 
related to the former, such an assumption (2) ignores potential diversity in management be-
haviour (e.g. McDonald & Makin, 2000; Pearce, 1993; Torka & Schyns, 2010). In general, 
research shows that direct supervisors can strongly determine the working conditions of their 
subordinates (e.g. Perry & Kulik, 2008; Purcell & Hutchinson, 2007), and differences in the 
quality of the direct supervisor-subordinate relationship can explain inequalities in (perceived) 
working conditions among subordinates who share the same supervisor (e.g. Andrews & 
Kacmar, 2001; Lee, 2001; Piccolo et al., 2008; Scandura, 1999). Thus, differences in supervi-
sor-subordinate relationship quality between and among permanent staff and agency workers 
might determine dissimilarities in distributive justice perceptions.  
Again, with reference to evidence that agency workers and especially flexmigrants re-
ceive less fair treatment than permanent staff, one might argue the contract status and the 
origin directly determine the supervisor-subordinate relationship, and through this distribu-
tive justice. In other words, the agency workers’ relationship with their supervisor suffers, 
because they are agency workers and this holds and is even more true when they are mi-
grant workers. Thus, compared to permanent staff, the lower relationship quality explains 
(perceived) distributive injustice.  
Given these arguments and reflections, we decided to investigate how the supervisor-
subordinate relationship quality influences the contract status and distributive justice link as 
well as the agency workers origin and distributive justice link. The concept we focus on is 
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Leader-Member Exchange (LMX; e.g. Graen et al., 1982a, 1982b; Graen & Schiemann, 
1978) as it describes this relationship quality and also has been shown to be related to 
workers’ justice perceptions (e.g. Andrews & Kacmar, 2001; Lee, 2001; Piccolo et al., 
2008; Scandura, 1999). Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, the social exchange be-
tween the individual and his or her supervisor refers to interactional justice (e.g. Cropanza-
no et al., 2002) and interactional justice has a strong positive influence on distributive jus-
tice (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001). 
The second reason for including this construct is the fundamental premise of LMX the-
ory, namely, that supervisors have different relationships with each of their subordinates 
(e.g. Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Thus, rather than assuming that different worker groups 
such as permanent and agency workers or local agency workers and flexmigrants have a 
different relationship quality with their supervisor per se (i.e., simply because of their group 
membership), LMX researchers argue one needs to recognise and take into account indi-
vidualised relationships of each follower with their leader. Consequently, we cannot assume 
agency workers or flexmigrants as groups have low-quality relationships with their supervi-
sor or that permanent employees have high-quality relationships with their supervisor (Dan-
serau et al., 1975). Rather, following this skeptical line of reasoning, we assume that LMX 
might not depend on the contract status or classification as flexmigrant, but rather is an in-
dividualised phenomenon that changes or moderates the contract status as well as the origin 
and distributive justice connection.  
However, since research about the influence of LMX on the connection between con-
tract status as well as agency workers origin and distributive justice is lacking, we decided 
to test two hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 supports the idea that the contract status and the agen-
cy workers origin are decisive for LMX: The supervisor-subordinate relationship quality is 
less good for both groups of agency workers (locals and flexmigrants) than for permanent 
employees and, consequently, the former perceive less distributive justice than the latter. 
Hypotheses 4 is in line with LMX theory and assumes that group membership (i.e., agency 
workers vs. permanent employees and local agency workers vs. flexmigrants) is itself insuf-
ficient for LMX and, consequently, distributive justice.  
H3:  LMX mediates the relationship between contract status as well as agency workers’ 
origin and distributive justice concerning different aspects of HRM. 
H4:  LMX moderates the relationship between contract status as well as agency work-
ers’ origin and distributive justice concerning different aspects of HRM. 
Method 
Procedure 
We decided to conduct our research in the Dutch logistics industry, because this industry is 
a heavy user of agency workers. The largest group of flexmigrants (30%) work in logistics 
(Van Baars, 2014). We contacted the business manager of logistics of a member organisa-
tion of the largest association of Dutch employment agencies. We requested and were 
granted access to user firms that also use agency workers from Central European countries. 
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Finally, three logistics companies, each having over 100 employees, agreed to participate in 
the research. To gain insight into differences and similarities in HRM for agency workers 
and permanent workers as well as for local agency workers and Polish agency workers, we 
conducted 12 lengthy semi-structured pilot interviews, including the HR manager, a direct 
supervisor, an agency worker, and a permanent employee in each company. We asked 
questions about similarities and differences between the respective worker groups, focusing 
on the following aspects of HRM: pay, physical and social working conditions, job content, 
information, voice, participation, and development opportunities. To test our hypotheses, 
we then conducted questionnaire research in the three companies among workers perform-
ing low-skilled jobs (i.e., jobs without requirements for formal education/training). The 
questionnaire was also translated into Polish.  
Participants 
241 respondents participated in the research: 109 Dutch permanent workers, 65 Dutch 
agency workers, and 67 Polish agency workers. The overall response rate was 33 percent. 
In company 1, the response rate was the highest: 50.2 percent compared to just 18.7 percent 
in company 2 and 31.1 percent in company 3. The large differences in response rate can be 
explained by the differences in research support from user firm managers. In company 1, 
management was most supportive: in contrast to company 2 and 3, management invited the 
researcher to return several times to collect data.  
The Polish agency workers (Kruskal-Wallis test: mean rank = 79.21; df=2; p=.00) are 
significantly younger (median= < 25 years) than the Dutch agency workers (mean rank = 
114.95; median = 25 – 35 years), which, on their turn, are significantly younger than the 
Dutch permanent workers (mean rank = 150.30; median = 35 - 45 years). More than 55 
percent of the Polish agency workers are younger than 25 years of age. In contrast, 13.8 
percent of the permanent workers fall into this age category. In addition, 49.5 percent of the 
Dutch permanent workers, 32.3 percent of the Dutch agency workers and 9 percent of the 
Polish agency workers are older than 35 years of age. Besides that, the distribution of gen-
der differs between the three groups (chi2=15.665; df=2; p=.00). 31.3 percent of the Polish 
agency workers are female; in contrast to 16.9 percent of Dutch agency workers and 8.3 
percent of Dutch permanent workers.  
In general, 46.2 percent of the agency workers work for less than six months for the us-
er firms, 15.9 percent between six months and less than a year, 31.8 percent between one 
year and less than three years and 6 percent for more than three years. The average duration 
of work is nine months. However, in contrast, 62.7 percent of the Polish agency workers 
work for less than 6 months for the user firms. The mean difference is significant at the 
0.05 level. Finally, more than 70 percent of the agency workers, both Polish and Dutch, 
prefer a contract with the user firm over an agency contract.  
Instruments 
Distributive justice. Karregat and Steensma (2005) developed an overall measure for dis-
tributive justice including aspects of pay, physical working conditions, job content, infor-
mation, development opportunities, and amount of team meetings. We used their work as 
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starting point, but decided to design our own scale because their measurement does not (a) 
differentiate between raising voice and direct influence in decision-making (participation) 
and (b) several important distributive justice aspects were measured with only one or two 
items (i.e. pay, job content, information). We measured only one aspect of distributive jus-
tice (i.e. physical working conditions) with just one item (compared to ..., my physical 
working conditions are …). For distributive justice concerning pay, job content, infor-
mation, voice, participation and development opportunities, we designed Likert scales with 
more than one item measurements. Reliability analyses show sufficient internal consisten-
cy: for pay (2 items) α = .78, job content (9 items) α = .90, information (3 items) α = .87, 
voice (3 items) α = .85, direct participation (3 items) α = .91 and development (5 items) α = 
.91 (see Appendix 1 for items and PCA Eigenvalues (λ) of the six factors; we used indices 
for the dependent variables). We asked the agency workers to compare themselves with 
permanent employees and permanent employees to compare themselves with agency work-
ers on a five-point Likert scale (1 = much worse; to 5 = much better) on all the single items.  
 
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX). Leader-member exchange (LMX) was assessed using a 
Dutch and a Polish translation of the 12-item scale LMX MDM developed by Liden and 
Maslyn (1998). Sample items include “I like my supervisor very much as a person” and “I 
do work for my supervisor that goes beyond what is specified in my job description”. Re-
sponses were recorded on a five-point scale from 1=totally disagree to 5=totally agree. The 
internal consistency for the overall assessment of LMX was α = .91.  
We ascertained the contract status by asking the respondents if they had a permanent 
contract with the firm under investigation or were agency workers. Moreover, we asked the 
respondents about their origin, gender, age, contract preference (agency or user firm con-
tract) and tenure user firm. 
Analytic strategy 
We conducted analyses of covariance (One-way ANCOVA) to determine a statistically sig-
nificant difference between agency workers and permanent workers (hypothesis 1) and be-
tween Polish agency workers and Dutch agency workers (hypothesis 2) on distributive justice, 
controlling for potentially influencing background variables: We controlled for gender, age, 
contract preference (user firm contract) and tenure user firm. We checked for ANCOVA as-
sumptions as normal distribution, homogeneity of variances (Levene’s test), homogeneity of 
regressions slopes (via pre-testing significance of the interaction term in ANCOVA) and line-
arity of the regression. The latter is checked via Cramér’s V and Spearman’s correlation, for 
all groups, before conducting the ANCOVA. This showed that age, gender and contract pref-
erence are no relevant covariates. The assumption of independency (Keppel & Wickens, 
2004) failed for tenure. However, the independent variable is an observed variable and not a 
manipulated randomly assigned variable. Thus, it is an observable fact that the independent 
variable has a linear relation with the covariate which has not been created by the researchers. 
Tenure does not affect whether an employee is Polish or not nor works for an agency. There-
fore the assumption of independence between the independent variable and the covariate is 
less relevant in this case. In the ANCOVA analyses job tenure is included as covariate. 
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To test hypotheses 3 and 4 we performed regression analyses. Given our interest in the 
role of LMX in the contract status and distributive justice link as well as the agency work-
ers origin and distributive justice link (hypotheses 3 and 4), we designed two dummy varia-
bles: D1 and D2. D1 represents the Dutch agency workers and D2 the group permanent 
workers. If D1 and D2 are disregarded (both are 0) the group Polish workers comes into 
view (Polish agency workers = 0/0; Dutch agency workers = 1/0; permanent workers = 
0/1). Thus, the reference category are the Polish agency workers. These dummy variables 
are useful because they enable the use of a single regression equation to represent the three 
groups. In model 1, because of the significant differences in perceived distributive justice 
between the groups (i.e., Polish agency workers, Dutch agency workers en permanent 
workers), we included job tenure as a control variable. The two dummies D1 and D2 were 
included in model two; in model 3 we included LMX, and in model 4 the two interactions 
terms were included. In addition, we conducted the mediation analysis following the four 
steps recommended by Baron and Kenney (1986). Moreover, we conducted Sobel-tests 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) in the fourth step to examine the significance of the mediation. 
Interview findings: HRM for agency workers and permanent employees  
In all companies, agency workers seem to receive less pay than permanent employees. This 
can be explained by ‘strictly observing’ former Dutch formal regulations: it was permissi-
ble to pay agency workers who work for less than 26 weeks for the same agency and user 
firm less than user firms pay permanent employees. Since 30th March 2015, from day one 
of their assignment, agency workers receive the same salary as user firms permanent staff. 
It should be noted our research was conducted before this date. As mentioned before, 46.2 
percent of all agency workers and 62.7 percent of the Polish agency workers work for the 
user firm for less than a half year. Moreover, it seems most agency workers perform less 
complex tasks than permanent staff, and this difference in complexity might also explains 
pay disparities.  
Company 3 offers all agency workers training-on-the-job, but in company 1 and 2 this 
is reserved for permanent staff and agency workers with the prospect for a permanent con-
tract with the user firm. According to all three HR managers, agency workers generally 
have to work at least one year for the user firm before they are offered a permanent con-
tract. Moreover, the managers emphasize that while ‘good’ Polish agency workers could 
get a permanent labour contract, these workers normally do not want such long-term in-
volvement. This is in sharp contrast to our finding that 71.6 percent of the Polish agency 
workers prefers a contract with the user firm.  
Concerning physical and social working conditions, the overall picture is that the user 
firms try to minimize the differences in treatment for agency workers and permanent work-
ers. According to the interviewees, most Polish agency workers ‒ due to their very weak 
acquisition of Dutch ‒ seem to be less socially integrated than local agency workers. How-
ever, company 1 does decidedly invest in promoting social integration by different initia-
tives to decrease the distance between Dutch and Polish workers. Information posters about 
Poland written in Dutch and about the Netherlands written in Polish can be seen all over the 
workplace. Furthermore, posters with translations of commonly used words in both lan-
guages are visible.  
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Table 1: HR practices for agency and permanent workers in the three Dutch logistics 
companies 
HR practice-
Company 
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
Job content Only agency workers with prospect for standard employment 
perform more complex tasks 
More challenging tasks also 
for agency workers without 
prospect for standard em-
ployment 
Development  
opportunities 
Training-on-the-job only for agency workers with prospect for 
standard employment 
Training-on-the-job also for 
agency workers without pro-
spect for standard employ-
ment. Only permanent staff 
can follow a personal devel-
opment trajectory 
Physical working 
conditions 
The same for agency and permanent workers 
 
Social working 
conditions 
Local agency workers are well integrated; Polish less because of language problems 
 
Pay Agency workers receive less pay than permanent employees 
Information, Voice 
and  
Direct participation 
Only agency workers with pro-
spect for standard employment 
attend team meetings together 
with permanent staff. Other local 
agency workers have their own 
meetings. Polish workers have a 
weekly meeting with their coor-
dinator. 
Local agency and permanent 
workers attend meetings to-
gether, agency employee 
proficient in Polish attends 
these meetings on behalf of 
the Polish workers. 
Agency and permanent work-
ers attend meetings together. 
 
Concerning information equality, company 1 is the only user firm that translates the news 
bulletin into Polish. The company also employs three coordinators for the Polish agency 
workers, all of whom are fluent in the language pair. They are an important link in the 
agency worker, user firm and agency relationship as well as for voice and direct participa-
tion opportunities. Company 1 has had the longest experience with Polish agency workers, 
which may explain why they seem to have a more sophisticated approach towards these 
workers than either company 2 or 3. In this context, it is somewhat surprising that, in con-
trast to company 2 and 3, in company 1 it is only agency workers with a the prospect for a 
permanent contract with the user firm who attend team meetings together with permanent 
employees.  
Questionnaire research findings 
The interview results show that the participating companies differ concerning several HRM 
aspects (i.e. job content, development opportunities, information, voice, and direct partici-
pation). Therefore, we tested if it is appropriate to do a cross-case analysis with the measure 
110 Nicole Torka, Ivy Goedegebure 
of association η2: Between group variability divided by total variability, which is compara-
ble to the intraclass correlation coefficient (e.g. Bickel, 2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
The ANOVA tests indicated it was acceptable to pool the data. Distributive justice concern-
ing information (η2 = .006), direct participation (η2 = .002), development opportunities (η2 
= .004), and job characteristics (η2 = .006), showed all F < 1. In addition, distributive jus-
tice concerning physical working conditions (η2 = .012; F (2, 235) = 1.45, p = .237), voice 
(η2 = .013; F (2, 236) = 1.53, p = .219), and pay (η2 = .009; F (2, 237) = 1.06, p = .348) 
were not significantly different between the three companies. See appendix 2 for correla-
tions between de dependent variables distributive justice and LMX. 
Hypotheses 1, which states agency workers perceive less distributive justice concerning 
different aspects of HRM than permanent workers, can be confirmed. Agency workers per-
ceive significantly less distributive justice concerning physical conditions, information, 
voice, participation, pay, development, and job characteristics than do permanent workers, 
even when controlled for job tenure (Table 2). The effect size of contract status is large, 
which means that 11-20% of the variance of distributed justice concerning different aspects 
of HRM is caused by whether the workers have a permanent or an agency contract even 
when controlled for job tenure. Agency workers perceive less distributive justice than per-
manent workers. 
 
Table 2: Analyses of covariance between agency workers (N = 109) and permanent workers 
(N = 131) concerning distributive justice regarding different aspects of HRM, 
controlling for tenure 
 M (SD) Contract relation Job tenure  
 agency permanent η2 df F η2 df F 
Physical Conditions 2.78 (1.08) 3.46 (.90) .112 (1, 237) 29.15** .026 (1, 237)   6.34** 
Information 2.89 (.93) 3.52 (.75) .150 (1, 239) 41.80** .046 (1, 239) 11.54** 
Voice 2.77 (.99) 3.49 (.79) .144 (1, 238) 39.71** .032 (1, 238)   7.79** 
Participation 2.34 (.99) 3.32 (.99) .171 (1, 239) 49.01** .023 (1, 239)   5.49** 
Pay 2.44 (1.06) 3.46 (.93) .147 (1, 239) 41.16** .007 (1, 239)   1.71 (ns) 
Development 2.43 (.93) 3.29 (.79) .204 (1, 240) 61.18** .044 (1, 240) 10.93 ** 
Job Characteristics 2.85 (.81) 3.53 (.70) .178 (1, 240) 51.65** .044 (1, 240) 10.95** 
** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
 
Hypothesis 2, stating that Polish agency workers perceive less distributive justice concern-
ing different aspects of HRM than Dutch agency workers, can only be partly confirmed 
(Table 3). We found significant differences between Dutch and Polish agency workers con-
cerning physical conditions, pay, development, and job characteristics, controlling for job 
tenure. This means: Even when controlled for job tenure, when Polish agency workers 
compare themselves with permanent staff they perceive less distributive justice concerning 
physical conditions, pay, development, and job characteristics than when Dutch agency 
workers compare themselves with permanent staff.. The effect size of Dutch-Polish origin 
is small to medium, which means that 5-6.5% of the variance of distributed justice concern-
ing different aspects of HRM is caused by the agency workers origin even when controlled 
for job tenure. Polish agency workers perceive less distributive justice than Dutch agency 
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workers. However, in contrast to the effect of ‘contract status’ on distributive justice (see 
hypothesis 1) the effect of ‘origin’ is relatively small. 
 
Table 3: Analyses of covariance between Dutch agency workers (N = 65) and Polish agency 
workers (N = 67) concerning distributive justice regarding different aspects of 
HRM, controlling for tenure 
 M (SD) Origin Dutch-Polish Job tenure  
 Dutch Polish η2 df F η2 df F 
Ph. Conditions 2.95 (.99) 2.61 (1.14)  .051 (1, 130) 6.90* .074 (1, 130) 10.30** 
Information 2.86 (.89) 2.92 (.98) .002 (1, 130) 0.219 .077 (1, 130) 10.73** 
Voice 2.66 (.97) 2.88 (1.00) .004 (1, 129)   .461 .048 (1, 129)   6.35* 
Participation 2.30 (.88) 2.39 (1.08) .000 (1, 130)   .002 .023 (1, 130)   2.95 
Pay 2.65 (.96) 2.22 (1.11) .055 (1, 130) 7.45** .021 (1, 130)   2.73 
Development 2.62 (.90) 2.24 (.92) .065 (1, 131) 8.91** .045 (1, 131)   6.14 * 
Job Characteristics 2.99 (.80) 2.85 (.81) .050 (1, 131) 6.848** .061 (1, 131)   8.43** 
** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
 
For correlations between the dependent distributive justice variables and LMX see Appen-
dix 2. The mediator role of LMX in the relation between contract status and distributive 
justice as well as agency workers origin and distributive justice (hypothesis 3) is partly con-
firmed. As shown in Table 4, both dummies, which stand for contract status as well as 
agency workers origin, are significant in model 2 for physical conditions (βD1 = .18, p < 
.05; βD2 = .61, p < .01), pay (βD1 = .19, p < .01; βD2 = .67, p < .01), development (βD1 = .21, 
p < .01; βD2 = .79, p < .01) and job characteristics (βD1 = .18, p < .01; βD2 = .73, p < .01), 
and dummy 2 is also significant for information (βD2 = .57, p < .01), voice (βD2 = .49, p < 
.01) and participation (βD2 = .57, p < .01). Dummy 1 (which represents the permanent 
workers) is not always significant because the factor ‘contract status’ explains differences 
(H1) in distributive justice more than agency workers origin does (H2). Both dummies (βD1 
= .4, p < .10; βD2 = .59, p < .01) are significantly related to the mediator LMX.  
 
Table 4, model 3, also shows that LMX is positively related to all the distributive justice as-
pects (physical conditions β = .41, p < .01; information β = .40, p < .01; voice β = .45, p < .01; 
participation β = .45, p < .01; pay β = .35, p < .01; development β = .52, p < .01; and job char-
acteristics β = .60, p < .01). In case LMX is a full mediator, the significant beta’s in model 2 
of the dummies have to disappear in model 3. This is not the case. Table 4 shows that LMX is 
a partial mediator because the path from the dummies to contract status is reduced in absolute 
size if LMX is considered into the equation, but it is still different from zero.  
With the Sobel test we checked the significance of this partial mediation effect of 
LMX. It turns out it is significant for all distributive justice HRM aspects (physical condi-
tions (Sobel test statisticD1 = 1.81, p < .10; Sobel test statisticD2 = 4.51, p < .01), infor-
mation (Sobel test statisticD2 = 4.45, p < .01), voice (Sobel test statisticD2 = 4.71, p < .01), 
participation (Sobel test statisticD2 = 4.76, p < .01), pay (Sobel test statisticD1 = 4.25, p < 
.01; Sobel test statisticD2 = 1.79, p < .10), development (Sobel test statisticD1 = 1.85, p < 
.10; Sobel test statisticD2 = 5.13, p < .01), and job characteristics (Sobel test statisticD1 = 
1.85, p < .10; Sobel test statisticD2 = 5.30, p < .01).  
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Table 4: Results of employment relation, LMX and distributive justice by multiple 
regression 
variables   Constant Tenure D1 D2 LMX D1*LMX D1*LMX Adj R2 ΔR2 F for ΔR2 
Physical 
conditions 
1 2.84** -.12†      .10 .01     3.36† 
2 2.91** -.27** .18* .61**    .14 .13   18.21** 
3 1.32** -.09 .13† .37** .41**   .29 .15   50.17** 
4 .91* -.09 .39† .66** .54** -.29 -.35 .29 .01     1.18 
Information 1 3.01** -.11      .01 .01     2.71 
2 3.24** -.30** .00 .57**    .15 .15   21.52** 
3 1.92** -.13 -.05 .33** .40**   .29 .14   46.93** 
4 1.68** -.13 .01 .64** .49** -.07 -.36 .29 .01     1.07 
Voice 1 2.85** -.15*      .02      5.03* 
2 3.16** -.23** -.09 .49**    .16    21.09** 
3 1.57** -.04 -.14* .22* .45**   .34    63.07** 
4 1.12** -.03 .23 .52* .59** -.40† -.36 .34      1.89 
Participation 1 2.34** -.22**      .04 .05   11.95** 
2 2.64** -.2.33* -.01 .57**    .20 .17   24.58** 
3   .86** -.01 -.07 .31** .45**   .38 .17   66.33** 
4   .36 -.05 .41* .50* .59** -.53* -.24 .39 .12     3.12* 
Pay 1 2.33** -.27**      .07 .08   19.18** 
2 2.43** -.15† .19** .67**    .23 .16   24.97** 
3   .99** -.00 .14* .46** .35**   .34 .11   38.71** 
4   .30 .01 .69** .81** .54** -.60** -.43† .35 .02     3.92* 
Development 1 2.48** -.19**      .03 .04     8.64** 
2 2.59** -.32** .21** .79**    .26 .23   36.94** 
3   .76** -.10 .14* .48** .52**   .49 .24 110.77** 
4   .69* -.10 .23 .50* .54** -.50 -.13 .49 .00       .13 
Job 
characteristics 
1 2.92** -.15*      .02 .02     5.63* 
2 3.02** -.32** .18** .73**    .21 .20   29.85** 
3 1.19** -.06 .10† .37** .60**   .53 .32 159.29** 
4 1.12** -.06 .02 .56** .63** -.08 -.20 .53 .00     1.02 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
Table 4, model 4, displays the results of testing hypothesis 4. We found a significant mod-
erator effect of LMX for voice, participation and pay, partly confirming the hypothesis. The 
results are shown graphically in Figure 1. All three groups score higher on perceived dis-
tributive justice concerning voice, participation and pay when LMX is perceived as high in-
stead of low. However, the Polish agency workers seem to benefit more from perceived 
high LMX than the other two groups (i.e., permanent staff and Dutch agency workers). The 
differences between Polish agency workers and permanent workers clearly disappear or be-
come smaller in a high LMX situation. In contrast, the differences between Dutch agency 
workers and permanent workers in a high LMX situation remain. Moreover, it seems Polish 
agency workers tend to have higher scores than Dutch agency workers have in a high LMX 
situation. 
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Figure 1a, 1b and 1c:  Interaction effect for perceived distributive justice concerning voice, 
participation and pay 
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Discussion 
Our results bolster previous evidence and assumptions (e.g. Brinkmann & Nachtwey, 2014; 
Helfen et al., 2015; Nienhüser & Matiaske, 2006): Agency workers perceive less distribu-
tive justice concerning pay, job content, physical working conditions, information, voice, 
direct participation, and development opportunities than permanent employees (confirma-
tion of hypothesis 1). A deeper look into the data shows that when comparing themselves 
with permanent staff, Polish agency workers perceive less distributive justice concerning 
pay, job content, physical working conditions, and development opportunities than when 
Dutch agency workers compare themselves with permanent staff (confirmation of hypothe-
sis 2). Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 could only be partly confirmed since Polish agency work-
ers do not perceive less distributive justice concerning information, voice, and direct partic-
ipation than local agency workers. Moreover, in contrast to the effect of ‘contract status’ on 
distributive justice the effect of ‘origin’ is relatively small. However, the effect of origin 
might is stronger for other work migrants. For example, Bulgarians seem to perceive more 
group discrimination than Polish people in the Netherlands. 66 percent of the Bulgarians 
perceive ‘very frequently’ group discrimination in contrast to 49 percent of the Polish peo-
ple. Moreover, while 81 percent of the Polish people are satisfied with their life in the 
Netherlands, only 45 percent of the Bulgarians are (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2015). 
It might is too easy pointing to ‘purposely’ discrimination as the explanation for Polish 
agency workers negative responses towards pay, job content, physical working conditions, 
and development opportunities. After all, several Dutch industries (i.e., food, horticulture 
and logistics) strongly have to depend on migrant workers (ABU, 2016) and therefore can-
not permit themselves discrimination and, consequently, undesired worker attitudes and be-
haviour (see also the special issue of the Journal of Managerial Psychology on employment 
discrimination against immigrants; Dietz, 2010). What are alternative explanations? Per-
ceived distributive injustice concerning pay can be the result of unfulfilled expectations. In 
the theoretical section (see the reasoning for hypothesis 2), we argued that work migrants 
might have higher expectations concerning monetary rewards than local agency workers 
and permanent staff: They may make higher sacrifices (for example, leaving their home 
country and family [temporarily]) and have higher living costs (for example, housing in the 
Netherlands and abroad) than their local counterparts. Referring to job content and physical 
working conditions, studies show that (initially) the occupational status after migration de-
creases. Researchers point to limited command of the migration countries language and a 
misfit between migrants education and labour market demands as reasons (e.g. Akresh, 
2006; Chiswick et al., 2005). Finally, Polish agency workers perceived distributive injustice 
concerning development opportunities might be explained by a mismatch between their mi-
grant country orientation and temp agencies as well as user companies assumptions. In con-
trast to what has been assumed for many years, many migrants from Central Europe and 
especially Poland perceive their stay in the Netherlands not as temporarily and purely in-
come oriented, but wish to relocate permanently. This seems to be especially true for lower 
educated people and those with a family in the Netherlands. In general, 56 percent of the 
Polish people want to stay in the Netherlands (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2015). In other words: 
It is not only between group differences (i.e., local vs. foreign agency workers) that might 
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be relevant, but also within group differences (e.g., foreign agency workers are a heteroge-
neous group).  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 challenged research that found a direct relationship between con-
tract status (here, agency workers vs. permanent employees) and unequal treatment (e.g. 
Brinkmann & Nachtwey, 2014; Helfen et al., 2015; Nienhüser & Matiaske, 2006). Based 
on empirical studies, we alternatively presumed Leader-Member Exchange (LMX; i.e., the 
quality of the relationship with the direct supervisor at the user firm as perceived by his/her 
followers) mediates and/or moderates these relationships. In other words, the contract status 
determines LMX and, consequently, distributive justice perceptions (hypothesis 3) and/or 
the contract status does not determine LMX (i.e., the relationship quality with the direct su-
pervisor can be low or high for permanent employees and agency workers), but LMX de-
termines distributive justice (hypothesis 4). Moreover, although this is not the first study 
that includes LMX in the context of temporary work (see Flickinger et al., 2016), to our 
knowledge this is the first study on LMX that takes migrant status into account (i.e. Dutch 
agency workers vs. Polish agency workers). Our results show that hypothesis 3 and 4 are 
complimentary. Although, a direct relationship between contract status and distributive jus-
tice perceptions remains when testing the mediator effect of LMX, contract status seems 
partly to determine perceived LMX and, consequently, perceived justice. Thus, the observa-
tion that agency workers in general (hypothesis 1) and specifically Polish agency workers 
(hypothesis 2), compared to permanent workers, perceive less justice, can be partly ex-
plained by the negative effect their contract status has on LMX (hypothesis 3).  
However, the differences in perceived justice concerning voice, participation and pay 
between the groups (i.e., permanent staff, local agency workers, Polish agency workers) 
change when individual workers (i.e., independent of group membership) perceive high-
quality LMX (hypothesis 4). In this context, it is important to notice that in terms of dis-
tributive justice concerning pay, participation, and voice, the results show Polish agency 
workers seem to respond better to experienced high-quality LMX than do Dutch agency 
and permanent workers (see for possible explanations below). These findings challenge the 
outcomes Flickinger et al. (2016) found in their study among (mostly) highly qualified 
permanent staff and agency workers: For agency workers, the role of LMX in the relation-
ship between job satisfaction and turnover intentions seems to be reduced. 
Our results show that independent of the contract status or origin, a good relationship 
with the supervisor is better for perceived justice than a bad relationship (see also, for ex-
ample, Andrews & Kacmar, 2001; Lee, 2001; Piccolo et al., 2008; Scandura, 1999). There-
fore, this study indirectly supports research that shows a positive influence of interactional 
justice (the social exchange between the individual and his or her supervisor refers to inter-
actional justice; e.g. Cropanzano et al., 2002) on distributive justice (e.g. Colquitt et al., 
2001). Moreover, agency workers can also develop a high-quality relationship with their di-
rect supervisor. Thus, as stated in our theoretical framework, supervisors can have different 
relationships with each of their specific subordinates, independent of their contract status or 
origin. These findings show that assuming a direct relationship between contract status and 
consequences in general is misguided: many factors can interfere.  
For the differences between Dutch and Polish workers concerning the influence of 
LMX, two reasons might be responsible. First, Polish workers may appreciate a good rela-
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tionship with their supervisor significantly more than Dutch workers do. After all, for them 
‘good treatment’ or ‘non-discrimination’ in the Netherlands in general seems less obvious 
than for Dutch people (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2015). Second, Polish workers may meaning-
fully ascribe more power to their supervisor than Dutch workers do (Kolman et al., 2003). 
Given these assumed differences, future research should include relevant measures to detect 
these subtle yet effective factors. 
Practical implications 
Adequately meeting workers expectations is essential for desired attitudes and, consequent-
ly, behaviour (e.g. Bao Le et al., 2015; Chambel et al., 2016). Therefore, agencies as well as 
user firms are well advised to monitor the diverse preferences of agency workers in general 
and should not simply base their decision-making about ‘what is appropriate HRM’ on as-
sumptions and abstract categories such as age, gender or origin. After all, inappropriate 
HRM as perceived by agency workers might result in undesired behaviour. As literature 
shows, for agencies and user firms alike it seems to be important to monitor the orientation 
of migrant workers towards the country of work: Do they want to stay or do they want to 
go? Our research shows that managers assumptions about this orientation was wrong (i.e., 
Polish workers do not want a permanent contract with the user firm): 71.6 percent of the 
Polish agency workers seem to prefer such a contract and research shows that the majority 
of Polish people (56%) want to relocate to the Netherlands permanently.  
Moreover, the results show that the relationship quality with the direct supervisor at the 
user firm seems decisive for agency and permanent workers justice perceptions. Thus, is it 
permissible to scapegoat supervisors for unfair treatment? Our answer is negative. In gen-
eral, even when top management delegates operational HRM to direct supervisors, the for-
mer should communicate expectations concerning worker treatment to the line, and then 
monitor closely if and how supervisors act accordingly. Furthermore, agencies and user 
firms have a shared responsibility for the treatment of agency workers: Agencies ‘deliver’ 
the basic working conditions (i.e., pay and benefits); user firm’s other aspects of HRM 
(e.g., physical and social working conditions, job content). Since the treatment offered by 
one party can cause spill-over effects for the other party in a positive or negative sense (e.g. 
Benson, 1998; Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2006; Liden et al., 2003; Van Breugel et al., 2005), 
agencies and user firms are well advised to continuously discuss their HRM in action, and 
if necessary correct each other on a timely basis. 
Limitations and future research directions 
As with all studies, this one also has shortcomings that should be addressed; not at least to 
overcome those in future research. For several reasons the transferability of the results is 
limited. The research was done in the Netherlands and encompasses only one sector (logis-
tics), three companies, and (a limited number of) low-skilled workers. Therefore, transfer-
ring assumptions based on this study to other countries, sectors, companies, and worker 
groups should be done with caution. As explained before, even after implementing the EU’s 
Agency Work Directive, space for differences in treatment can remain. Thus, additional 
country specific regulations as well as individual agencies and user firms can ‘enrich’ this 
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space in a positive or negative sense. This raises the virtue of calling for crossnational and 
multiple case study research.  
Referring to multiple case studies, in contrast to what previous evidence shows, our 
participating organisations tried to do their best to offer to all agency workers fair HRM. As 
such we can refer to them as ‘best cases’. Getting insight into the other side of the ‘ex-
treme’ continuum, into critical worst cases, would be an asset since these no doubt might 
acutely challenge our findings: For example, in organisations that really discriminate (cer-
tain) agency workers one might not find a moderator effect, but a full mediator effect of 
LMX. However, admittance to such organisations with common strategies is very difficult, 
and applying ‘mainstream’ methods may is impossible.  
For several reasons, we are also critical on what and how we have measured. First, jus-
tice researchers routinely rightly emphasize the importance of including distributive, proce-
dural, interpersonal, and informational justice (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). We 
only measured distributive justice perceptions and indirectly a form of interactional justice, 
namely LMX. Second, we mentioned before it is possible that differences in justice percep-
tions concerning HRM relate to different (pre-entry) expectations. Several scholars assume 
that this so-called psychological contract should be taken into account in research on justice 
perceptions (e.g. Cropanzano & Prehar, 2001; Herriot et al., 1997) and in particular re-
search on agency workers (Guest, 2004; McLean Parks et al., 1998; Rousseau, 1995). How-
ever, we did not measure workers expectations. Third, we only measured LMX among sub-
ordinates and therefore excluded another central party: the direct supervisor at the user 
firm. Moreover, and this has not been done yet, it would be advantageous to include the 
contact person at the agency to see whether or not, and if so to what degree, the quality of 
this relationship also influences agency workers’ justice perceptions. Fourth, we controlled 
for several background variables including gender, age, contract preference (user firm con-
tract) and tenure user firm. In contrast to tenure user firm, in this study age, gender and con-
tract preference are no relevant covariates. However, these variables might play a role in 
different study settings and therefore should be included in future research. Research should 
also include education (level), orientation towards the migrant country (preference for per-
manent or temporary stay) and perceived own and group discrimination in general (i.e., 
outside the work context) Because all participants performed low skilled jobs, we did not 
measure education level. As mentioned before, the orientation towards the migrant country 
and perceived discrimination outside work might influence justice perceptions related to 
work. Finally, we asked the agency workers to compare themselves with permanent em-
ployees and permanent employees to compare themselves with agency workers concerning 
several aspects of distributive justice. We decided to determine the comparison group in the 
way we did, because the large amount of research on agency workers shows unequal treat-
ment between agency workers and permanent staff. This can be seen as a serious limitation 
of the study. After all, we cannot be sure if these groups indeed are, from the viewpoint of 
the respondents, the most appropriate groups for comparison on issues of distributive jus-
tice. Moreover, comparative information about Polish agency workers’ perceived justice 
vis-à-vis local agency workers and vice versa is missing, as well as insight into permanent 
workers’ justice perceptions when comparing themselves with the two different groups of 
agency workers. Finally, this approach neglects the fact that agency workers are not a ho-
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mogenous group (e.g. De Cuyper et al., 2008; Guest, 2004). Therefore, future research 
should let the respondents decide with whom they wish to compare themselves.  
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire items distributive justice and results principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) 
Compared to ... 
(permanent employees respectively agency workers) ... is/are (1 = much worse; to 5 = much better) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Pay        
My pay 1.645      
My benefits (e.g., pension plan, travelling allowance)  .335      
Job content       
The variety in my job   5.428     
The challenge in my job  .874     
The clarity about my tasks  .744     
The freedom to plan my job and in performing my tasks  .682     
The fit between my job and my personal skills  .555     
The difficulty of my job   .460     
The support for performing my tasks  .368     
The appreciation I receive for my job effort  .342     
My supervisors assessment concerning my job effort  .316     
Information       
Information I receive about (changes in) my job   2.446    
Information I receive about (changes in) my department   .347    
Information I receive about (changes at) ... (name user firm)   .347    
Voice       
My opportunities to raise voice about (changes in) my job    2.312   
My opportunities to raise voice about (changes in) my department    .427   
My opportunities to raise voice about (changes at) ... (name user 
firm) 
  
 
.261   
Direct participation       
My opportunities to co-decide about (changes in) my job     2.561  
My opportunities to co-decide about (changes in) my department     .309  
My opportunities to co-decide about (changes at) ... (name user 
firm) 
  
 
 .130  
Development opportunities       
My opportunities for training-on-the-job for my current job      4.097 
My opportunities for development and/or education      .674 
My opportunities to get another job at ... (name user firm)      .524 
My opportunities to get a more complex job at ... (name user firm)      .304 
My promotion prospects       .247 
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Appendix 2: Correlations between de dependent variables distributive justice 
and LMX 
  Ph.  
Conditions 
Infor- 
mation 
Voice Participa-
tion 
Pay Develop-
ment 
Job 
Charac-
teristics 
Leader 
Member 
Exchange 
Physical  
Conditions 
R 1        
p         
N 238        
Information R .479** 1       
p .000        
N 237 240       
Voice R .538** .758** 1      
p .000 .000       
N 236 239 239      
Participation R .497** .624** .769** 1     
p .000 .000 .000      
N 237 240 239 240     
Pay R .471** .492** .540** .590** 1    
p .000 .000 .000 .000     
N 237 240 239 240 240    
Development R .608** .638** .653** .707** .632** 1   
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
N 238 240 239 240 240 241   
Job  
Characteristics 
R .650** .667** .718** .716** .629** .800** 1  
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 238 240 239 240 240 241 241  
Leader Member 
Exchange 
R .488** .481** .511** .521** .444** .619** .679** 1 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 237 238 237 238 238 239 239 239 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
